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ABSTRACT
One of the central problems addressed, but not yet answered by
modern finance theory is the determination of the optimal capital
structure of the firm. Since publication of the original Miller-
Modigliani hypothesis, there have been several papers identifying
costs or benefits of debt which would impel the debt-equity ratio
downward or upward; most have been concerned with identifying
costs of debt.
One such theory is that of Myers (1976) who applies the theory
of options pricing to show how the presence of growth opportunities
should limit the amount of debt a firm takes into its capital structure.
Not only is this theory novel and interesting -- it is also, with the
help of the Capital Asset Pricing Model -- testable. The test would
not only support or not support the theory, it would also in the event
that the results were positive, lend some quantification to the theory.
This thesis accordingly specifies and carries out a test of the
Myers theory. The results provide strong support of the theory, while
at the same time, subsidiary tests suggest that alternative theories
do not accord with what firms do in practice.
Thesis Supervisor Stewart C. Myers
Title : Professor of Finance
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Introduction
One of the central problems remaining to be solved by
modern finance theory is the determination of the optimal capital
structure of the firm. Theory can demonstrate that a firm should
add to its stock of capital as long as the marginal rate of return on
investments exceeds the required rate of return, but it is not able
to demonstrate which of the various instruments of financing should be
used. In particular, what proportion of debt to equity should be used
in the capital structure; it is usually assumed that the choice of part-
icular types of debt instrument or forms of equity is of secondary
importance compared to the main question.
Discussion of the debt-equity problem more usually tends to the
presecriptive rather than the descriptive, although occasional attempts
are made to reconcile what ought to be with what is. For example,
Miller and Modigliani [1966] examine the debt policies of various firms
in particular industries and attempt to reconcile their behaviour with
what certain finance theorists have suggested that behaviour should be.
Before discussing the work of these theorists, however, it
should be helpful in developing the general thrust of this paper to briefly
review the history of ideas contributed by others in this field. The first
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breakthrough in understanding the problem came from the now-famous
paper by Miller and Modigliani [ 12 1 , in which the authors demon-
strated that, given perfect capital markets, and ignoring the effect
of taxes, the value of a firm would be independent of its capital struc-
ture (Proposition 1). In their 1963 article, these same authors extended
their theory to include the effect of taxation on the firm, positing that
the addition of debt to the capital structure increased the value of the
firm on account of the tax shields generated by the interest payments
on the debt; thus a quantity of debt, D, held in perpetuity, increases
the value of the firm by the amount tD, where t is the corporate tax
rate.
The power and elegance of the Miller-Modigliani propositions
make them intuitively appealing, and indeed, were we to believe that
the condition of perfect financial markets obtained, it would be difficult
to refute Proposition 1. However, the real world situation is radically
different from that implied by theory; the Miller-Modigliani theory
indicates that firms should take on as much debt as possible (i. e. the
ratio D/(D + E) should approach 1.0),iA order to derive as much value
from the tax shields as possible--while in actual practice, we see firms
tend to keep their debt levels to 20% or 30% of the total value of their
firm. We must conclude either that corporate financial officers are
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prepared to ignore, en masse, large profit opportunities (which
seems unlikely), or that there are pwerful financial factors at work
which will counteract the effect of the tax shields.
The majority of recent work in this area has, indeed, been
concerned with identifying those factors which will cause a firm to
limit the amount of debt it wishes to issue. Without going into detail
quite yet, we may refer to the work of Kraus and Litzenberger [ 9 1
who demonstrate that the value of the firm declines as the probability
of bankruptcy increases (and increased debt heightens the liklihood of
ban kruptcy), to the work of Jensen and Meckling [ 8 ] who discuss the
agency costs of debt which arise out of the fact that the owners and
managers of a firm may not behave optimally from the point of view
of the bondholders, and to the work of Myers [ 15 1, who discusses the
effect that the presence of future growth opportunities may have on the
debt policy of the firm. While the majority of finance textbooks con-
centrate on the possibility of bankruptcy as the most important of these
costs, the thrust of the argument presented by any or all of these
authors is essentially the same: a firm will continue to add debt to its
capital structure until the costs arising out of the factors mentioned
above outweigh the incremental gain from leverage. The argument is
best presented graphically in Figure 1.
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Unfortunately, using this approach still leaves a gap between
the descriptive and the normative. The value to the firm added by
the tax shields is so large, and we would argue that the costs of debt
arising from the considerations enumerated above are so small, that the
kind of balance suggested by Figure 1 should still lead to high debt ratios,
Figure 1
Firm Value
(V)
Cost of
Debt
Tax Shields
V according to MMI
Theoretical
optimum V,
D/D+E in-
cluding costs
of debt arising
from possibility
of bankruptcy,
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so that the value for D/(D + E) should still be quite high; we say that
the tax shield has a first-order effect, while the opposing cost factors
have only a second-order effect: always assuming, of course, that the
behaviour of corporate financial officers has some rationale behind it.
A possibility of a solution to this dillemna is indicated in the
most recent paper by Merton Miller on this subject[ 11 1. Miller ex-
tends the symmetry inherent in the risk-return argument of the Modig-
liani-Miller proposition I to include the possibility of individual leverage,
utilizing tax shields, as an alternative to corporate leverage. By ex-
amining the borrowing possibilities open to the individual, and the rela-
tionship existing between the personal income tax, the corporate tax and
the capital gains tax, Miller claims to demonstrate that on the margin,
the individual will be indifferent to the tax shields generated by corp-
orate debt, since he can as easily generate these shields himself.
Hence the value of the firm will not increase as a result of leverage, and
on the margin, the MM proposition I holds, even in the presence of tax
shields.
It can be seen that were this literally to be the case, a dis-
crepancy would have arisen in the opposite direction to that indicated before:
that is, in view of the costs to debt enumerated by the various authors
mentioned above, since there is no tax shield advantage to be gained
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from leverage, it would appear that the optimum debt-equity is in-
determinant for individual f irms (but definitely less than 1). Since
this is manifestly not the case as practised ( the ANOVA test
described in Appendix D demonstrates a systematic difference in debt
levels between industries), we must assume that, as before, either
one finance professor or many corporate officers are incorrect, and,
as before, we may guess that it is the theory which needs to be modified.
Modifications to Miller's theory are, in fact, not difficult to
justify; for example, the particular relationship which the theory re-
quires between the corporate, personal income and capital gains taxes
may not hold; firms may be able to borrow at more advantageous rates
than individuals; or total borrowings which a firm and a shareholder
may accomplish together (i. e. corporate leverage plus individual lev-
erage on that firm's shares) may be greater than the borrowings whi ch
the shareholder might be able to accomplish on the shares of the un-
levered firm. Accordingly, we may assume that there will still be
some increase in the firm's value arising out of the tax shields, but it
will not,by any means, be as great as the original MM proposition I
asserted. In the parlance that was used above, if the various costs of
debt already mentioned are 'second-order' effects, then the tax shield
effect is also second-order, and there will thus be some trade-off point
between the gains and costs which could quite rationally be seen as lying
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inside the range which firms have placed their capital structures.
Thus we can see that, by modifying the arguments used most
recently by Merton Miller, and comparing the (small) gains which the
tax shields are now supplying to the value of the firm with the (small)
costs arising out of the use of debt in the capital structure of the firm,
we can develop a theoretical analysis of what the optimum capital
Figure 2
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structure should be which corresponds reasonably closely with what
the capital structures of the majority of firms are. (See Figure 2)
In doing so, however, we have not come very far; we have only
assembled a structure of forces and counterforces which seem to be
of the right order of magnitude to provide a reasonable explanation
of the real world situation. As soon as we try to quantify the effect
of these various factors, the complexity and innumerability of the
disparate variables involved in the determination of the degree of their
effect makes any attempt at precise measurement impossible.
Given, however, that the general hypothesis as assembled
above seems workable and worthy of investigation, there is an inter-
mediate step whi ch can be taken between the statement of the hypothesis
and quantification of it; this involves taking the various factors which
different authors have suggested as being contributors to the cost of
debt, and testing the behaviour of firms to see whether, indeed, the
presence of any of these factors affects what the firm does. If we are
to do this, we need, first of all, to examine in greater detail exactly
what the various authors propose.
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Bankruptcy Costs of Debt:
The first indirect cost of debt to be specified (mentioned by
Miller-Modigliani, but first emphasized by Robichek and Myers) was
the cost of bankruptcy. Kraus and Litzenberger [ 9 1 have shown
that the costs which would arise were the firm to go bankrupt must
be included in the valuation of the firm (in all states of nature). The
relevant costs, however, must be fully understood. If bankruptcy involved
merely the transition of power from the stockholders to the creditors,
without any influence on the firm's costs and revenues, the value of the
firm would not be affected by bankruptcy. However, three factors do
influence the cash flows of the firm:
a.) Reorganization Costs--costs of changing manage-
ment, investment policies, etc.
b.) Administrative Costs--cost of legal fees, refer-
ee's fees, trustee's fees. The major component,
legal fees, are subject to the approval of the
court and are a declining percentage of the
level of assets realized.
c.) Embarrassment Costs--Baxter { 2 1 suggests
that the major cost to the bankrupt firm is
negative effect on the earnings stream of the
bankruptcy proceedings.In particular, trade
credit will be difficult to obtain as customers
will be uncertain about the reliability of the firm.
Of course, quantifying the effects of these three phenomena is
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extremely difficult, if not impossible. (Warner [ 17 1 argues that
these costs are minimal) One must examine not only the probable
costs if the firm were to go bankrupt, but also the probability
of bankruptcy as a function of the level of debt. Up to this point
in time, no major study of the true costs of bankruptcy has been
published (perhaps because of the nonavailability of consistent data
across industries), and estimates of the true cost of bankruptcy
vary greatly. (Estimates of between 5% (the Warner estimate) and
40% of total assets realized have been cited.) In any case, this is
definitely an area which would benefit from a thorough quantitative
analysis.
Agency Costs of Debt:
The most comprehensive paper on the topic of agency costs
to a firm is that by Jensen and Meckling [ 8 1. The authors identify
various effects arising out of the fact that the interests of the bond-
holders of the firm are often different from, and sometimes antag-
onistic to, the interests of the stockholders of the firm and the managers
of the firm. One of the costs involved is, of course, that of bankruptcy
discussed above. A second cost is that of Bonding and Monitoring. Bond-
ho lders must apply restrictive clauses to the terms of their debt
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contracts in order to protect themselves against a variety of actions
that could be taken by management, such as dividend policies which
transfer all the wealth to the managers. The cost of these restric-
tive act ions, or the cost implicit in these actions not being taken
will be passed on by the bondholders to the owners of the firm. A
third cost is the opportunity wealth loss caused by the impact of the
debt on the invest ment decisi ons of the firm; inasmuch as upside
gain accrues to shareholders, whereas some of the downside risk
will be borne by the debtholders, an asymmetry results which may
cause managers of a firm to opt for investments which have higher
risk than other potential investments offereing the same return.
Although Jensen and Meckling's position is intuitively ap-
pealing, there are counter arguments to some of their assumptions
(For example, it is unlikely that managers willingly court the risk of
bankruptcy since many managers do not hold a diversified portfolio,
but have a large proportion of their investment and human capital
placed on the future of their company.), a further difficulty is that
it is a complex task to attempt to quantify and thus test the variables
which the authors suggest are influential in the manager's capital
structure decision.
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Options Costs of Debt :
One of the more powerful tools currently being used to extend
the impact of modern financial theory is the theory of Options Pricing,
as developed by Fischer Black and Myron Scholes [ 5 1. By viewing
the future growth opportunities of the firm as options for investment,
the theory can be applied to the problem of optimal capital structure;
Myers [ 15 ] demonstrates how the presence of growth opportunities
could influence the debt-equity decision. By utilizing the Capital Asset
Pricing Model, moreover, and various measures derived from it, it
is empirically possible to test Myers' theory against the actual behaviour
of firms to se whether, in the aggregate, their capital structure pol-
icies are in accordance with what the theory says they ought to be. The
purpose of this thesis is to perform these tests, and in the light of the
results of the tests to say something, both descriptively and norma-
tively, about the capital structure decisions of the firm. Accordingly,
the following chapter is devoted to a more extensive description of
Myers' theory; this is followed by an analysis of what variables should
be examined in order to test the theory.
A nagging question which inevitably arises when one considers
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any of the above costs of debt, and their impact on the capital struc-
ture decision of the managers of the firm, is that of causality. Given
that finance theory is only just beginning to see that the above factors
have an impact on the value of the firm, is it reasonable to suppose
that corporate financial managers have known about these factors all
along and have incorporated them into their financial decisions? Because
if the financial officers do not know about these factors, then even if
the factors do have an effect on the value of the firm, we can only say
that there is a gap between the normative and the descriptive, and that
there is an opportunity for corporations to make better financing de-
cisions . In other words, the argument implicit in this paper, that
finance theory must correspond at least approximately with what actually
occurs in the real world if it is to make any sense, is incorrect.
Merton Miller[ 11 1 offers an interesting way out of this dillemna.
He likens the corporate financial behaviour to human evolution, and suggests
that on a 'survival of the fittest principle, only those firms whose
financial decisions correspond reasonably closely to the normative will
survive corporate competition. He suggests that there exists a pool of
'neutral' responses, or heuristics, which firms use as rules of thumb
when making their decisions; these heuristics serve as surrogates or
-17-
approximations for the normative. If a response in this pool is
harmful to the firm, then sooner or later it will vanish, eradi-
cated by the law of natural selection. If the response becomes,
through circumstance, beneficial to the firm, it will flourish and
become more extensively used. If the response remains neutral,
then it may continue to be used without affecting the fortunes of the
firm one way or another. Thus, Miller suggests, there may be
surrogate rules of thumb which are widely held by firms, which
direct their behaviour toward the normative without those firms
actually being aware of the implications of the normative. We will
return to a discussion of this point, which we feel is crucial for the
validity of our results.
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CHAPTER 1
Options Costs of Debt
Myers[ 15 ] identifies a particular cost of debt which arises out
of an asymmetry which can develop between the interests of share-
holders and the interests of bondholders. The asymmetry originates
from the existence of 'discretionary expenditures'; these are ex-
penditures which the future income stream of the company depends
upon, but wnich the firm may or may not actually pay out, depending
on the developing state of nature. Myers gives a simple example
of a one-period investment in a firm without any other assets, and
suggests that the following scenario can develop:
1.) On the basis of the future investment opportunity, share-
holders borrow D from the creditors. They promise to
pay P at the end of the period, when the investment,I,
will have yielded V(s), where 's' is the state of nature
which will obtain at the end of the period. It will be seen
that the debt is risky debt; that is, V(s) will not necessarily
be so large that it will be sufficient to cover the promised
payment, P.
2.) This debt, D, now disappears into the pockets of the share-
holders, for all intents and purposes; it is not necessarily
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recoverable by the creditors.
3.) The shareholders now look at the future states of nature,
their probability of occurence, and the size of V(s) in each
of them. Let us first assume that the debt matures before
the decision to invest I or not is made. Then if the
actual value of V(s) is greater than I+P, the shareholders
will make the investment, and pay P. If it is less , then
the shareholders will bail out, and the creditors will take
over and make the investment if the expected value of V(s)
is greater than I. This is a clear-cut case; the payment
P will have been priced in relation to D to reflect the per-
ceived riskiness of the debt, and no asymmetry will exist.
4.) However, if the debt matures after the decision to invest
has to be made, i. e. after the option to invest has expired,
then if V(s) is less than I+P, the shareholders will not make
the investment, but the creditors will no longer have the option
of taking over the firm and making the investment, since the
opportunity to do this has now passed. In the difference be-
tween the two cases outlined here, it can be seen that a cost
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must be borne by either the shareholders or by the creditors.
5.) It can be seen that, since the liklihood of V(s) falling within
the critical space where the asymmetrical case occurs is a
function of the size of P, the greater the size is of the risky
debt that the firm issues, the larger the costs are which arise
out of this asymmetry.
Thus Myers' theory can be seen to depend on four preconditions:
a.) The existence of a class of assets within the firm which we
may refer to as 'growth options'.
b.) The existence of 'risky debt', that is, debt which is raised on
the expectation of the taking up of these options.
c.) The ability of shareholders to remove, through liberal dividend
policy (or by limiting future equity issues), some of the proceeds
of the issued debt.
d.) The existence of debt with a long enough maturity span for it
to mature after the decision to take up the options or not has
been made.
Halis [ 7 1 has shown that if there are dividend restrictions
placed on the firm, requirement 3 is not fulfilled, and the cost there-
fore disappears. (This restriction does not force equity issues, however.)
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However, a new cost, that of writing and implementing the res-
triction, has taken its place. Moreover, there still exists a cost,
also identified by Jensen and Meckling, in the form of an asymmetry
in the induced attitude to risk of the shareholders, compared to that
of the creditors. Any excess gain arising out of the upside risk of
the project will accrue to the shareholders; any loss from the downside
will be borne by the creditors as illustrated below:
more risky ess risky project
g proje
A ny loss 1 . * , n e c s
accrues to / g Any excessaccres t i .Mr . accrues to
creditors * stockholders
(Bankruptcy ==9 Expected Return
Thus the presence of risky debt will cause shareholders to
choseprojects with greater risk profiles than they would otherwise
choose; this might result in taking projects with negative net present
values--a cost wh ich must be borne by the shareholders or creditors.
(In any case, when the investment policy of a firm is not formulated
on the basis of present values, a cost has been imposed on the organ-
ization.
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The theory has been extended by Myers to the multiperiod
case with a portfolio of assets; Myers further demonstrates that the
presence of such debt at time t will not only cause an inappropriate
strategy (in some states of nature) at that time t, but will also cause
inappropriate strategies at t-1 and t+l. What, therefore, may we expect
the behaviour of firms to be, in light of this theory? First, we may
expect them to avoid taking on risky debt as opposed to debt that is
covered by real assets. However, we may further note that no debt
is entirely riskless. In any downturn of the economy, for example,
the value of a firm's assets will plummet, while the size of the debt
will remain constant. Hence, firms will view the major part of their
debt as 'risky', although they would still be expected to view debt which
is covered by the present value of their fixed assets as representing
less of a cost than debt which is based on the present value of their
growth opportunities. Thus two firms with the same assets but differing
growth opportunities can be expected to take on different amounts of
risky debt. Firms with greater growth opportunities should be expected
to take on less debt than those with not so many growth opportunities.
Further, firms with greater growth opportunities should take on debt with
a shorter maturity than firms with less opportunities.
-23-
This thesis primarily sets out to test the first of these
last two propositions. By quantifying the growth opportunities of
different companies, it should be possible to examine whether com-
panies' debt decisions are affected by the size of these opportunities
relative to the value of the firm. Inasmuch however, as there will
be many comapnies who do not order their capital structure in an
optimum fashion, it will only be in the aggregate that such a trend
will become visible.
One clear difference in growth opportunities exists between
companies in different industries. It is also clear that this type of
'real option! is the type that closely corresponds with the requirements
of Myers' theory; that is, if it is not taken up within a certain time,
the fact that other companies within the same industry will have
taken the option up and will have capitalized on it, will have removed
the opportunity of that option from the company. It therefore seems
possible to test the theory by examining whether different debt policies
are adopted by different industries, and if so, whether these differences
are a function of the presence of Present Value of Growth Opportunities.
-24-
CHAPTER 2
Model Specification and Testing
As stated in the introduction, the emphasis of this thesis
is placed on the testing of Myers' theory of debt determination dis-
cussed in the preceeding chapter. In testing this theory, we have
two major goals. First, we wish to see whether a statistically
significant causal relationship exists between the level of growth
opportunities open to the firm and the level of debt carried in the
capital structure. In addition, we want to determine whether the
Myers' theory does a better job of predicting actual debt levels than
a more primitive theory: that is, that firm's borrow solely on the
basis of the book value of their assets.
The initial step in testing the Myers theory is to set up a
standard against which we can judge the predictive value of the theory.
As mentioned above, we use the conventioanl wisdom, that firm's
borrow a set fraction of their book value of assets, to determine this
standard. [See Appendix A for a graphical depiction of this relation-
ship.] In order to quantify this relationship, we ran a simple regression
of the following specification:
-25-
Debti = a + b,* Asseti
where:
Debti = Level of debt for industry i
Asseti = Level of assets for industry i
Results of this regression can be found in Appendix B . The most
important statistic to be analyzed is the standard error of the re-
gression, in this case 426.478 million dollars. This is our target
value-- if the Myers' theory can lower the standard error, than it
adds to our predictive capability.
It will be noted that each of our tests are run using industry
aggregate data. We performed the tests in this manner because many
firms arbitrarily set debt levels for what appear to be idiosyncratic
reasons. Aggregating the firms into industry groups should help to
test the general effects of the concepts considered without introducing
systematic bias.
In testing the models, we selected five clearly defined industries
which have at least ten firms involved solely in the activities of that
industry. The five industries selected were:
a.) Textile Products
b.) Chemicals
c.) Electrical Switches & Controls
d.) Machine Tools
e.) Drugs -26-
The individual firms selected were those which most closely re-
sembled the others in that industry group in terms of production.
(See Appendix C ) Tne regressions were run using cross-sectional
data for December,1975 -- the last time period for which all necessary
data was available.
It is important to note that the level of debt to assets varies
significantly between industry groups. (See Appendix D for a des-
cription of the Analysis of Variance.) This means that in aggregating
into industry groups, we have not obscured significant counter-
balancing behaviours by the firms within the industry groups. (See
Appendix E for a description of the individual firm's debt levels.)
The first step in testing the Growth Options theory is to
determine whether a statistically significant relationship exists between
Present Value of Growth Opportunities(PVGO) and debt to asset ratios.
According to the Myers theory, we would expect the firm whose
market value is chiefly the result of growth opportunities to finance
less of its assets with debt than a firm with little growth potential but
a high level of short term earnings. We have specified the following
econometric model to test this:
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(D/A)i = a
where:
(D/A)1
(%PVGO)i
+ b * (%PVGO)i
= Book Value of Debt for Industry i divided by
Book Value of Assets for Industry i (Book
values were used because market values would
induce correlation with the PVGO measure.)
= Present Value of Growth Opportunities for Ind-
ustry i divided by Market Value of Industry i
Without any strong prior belief about the exact functional re-
lationship between growth opportunities and debt, we also test two
alternative variations on the linear models described above:
1.) Quadratic Model (Model #2)
D/A = a + b * (%PVGO) 2
2.) Multiplicative Model (Model #3)
D/A = a * (%PVGO)b
[ Tested in a logarithmic form: LOG(D/A) = a +b*LOG(%PVGO)]
It is clear that the definition of 'Present Value of Growth
Opportunities' and their measurement will be central to our results.
We have chosen to use the following identity in defining PVGO:
PVGOi = MV. - Eit / (1 + k)t
-28-
where:
PVGO[ = PVGO for firm i
MV. = Market Value for firm i
1
Eit = Earnings for firm i in time t from current Assets
t = Indicator for all future time periods
k = Cost of equity capital to the firm
The reasoning behind this identity is clear -- the market
value of a firm is equal to the earnings expected from currently held
assets plus the value of any earnings from future investment oppor-
tunities. Measuring the level of growth opportunities is less simple.
Producing detailed earnings forecasts for all fifty firms in
our sample would be an impossible task and, we believe , that investors
in the market do not attempt such accurate forecasting. It is more
plausible that the market makers determine a 'sustainable' level of
earnings when valuing a firm. We proxy this behaviour by calcu-
lating a normalized level of earnings for each firm in the sample.
Recognizing the fact that the market will not forecast earnings solely
on the basis of last period's earnings, but on the trend over time,
calcula ting normalized earnings was accomplished with the aid of the
following regression specification:
-29-
Earningsi=
where:
Earningsi 
=
Time =
b
a * (Time)
Earnings for industry i
Time trend
[ This specification was tested using a logarithmic form which reduces
to LOG(Earnings) = a + b * LOG(Time) ]
This equation was estimated for each firm in the sample over a five
year history ( see Appendix G ) and we take the fitted value for the
most recent time period (1975) as our estimation of the normalized
earnings.
Calculating 'k', the equity cost of capital for each firm is
a second necessary step in measuring the PVGOs. We utilized the
Capital Asset Pricing Model's Security Market Line to determine 'k'.
We employed the formula:
k-= z. = Bi(zm - R) + R
1
where:
k. = equity cost of capital for firm i
zi= expected return on equity for firm i
-30-
zm = expected return on the market portfolio
R = risk-free rate
Bi = beta for firm i
In performing the above calculations (see Appendix G for the
results.) we made use of the B estimations by Merrill Lynch and Co.
(for December ,1975). We used the Ibbotsen-Sinquefield result of 8.6%
as the risk premium (zm - R) and the 90-day Treasury bill rate of
5.4% (for December,1975) as the risk-free rate.
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CHAPTER 3
Estimation Results
A summary of the three regression tests is shown in
Figure 1 . (Complete results may be found in Appendix H )
Figure
Test
Number ?a' 'b' R-Squared
1. .37501 -. 2613 .9094
Linear (21. 2566) (6.4155)
2. .34164 -. 3584 .9725
Quadratic (47. 5862) (11. 9387)
3. -1.61072 -. 2601 .7113
Multiplicative (14. 0938) (3. 02369)
[Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics]
The size and significance of the constant 'a' and the coefficient
Ib? explain a great deal about the empirical reality of many of the
theories mentioned in the introduction to this thesis. Figure 2 details
the expected values of the two parameters to be estimated, given each
of the theories discussed. ( To insure that we have not just tested a
coincidental industry phenomenon, we show in Appendix I , the results
of Model #1 run for the firms with dummy variables for each industry.
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As expected, the R-squared is low, but the coefficient on PVGO is negative.)
Figure 2
Expected Expected
Theory ta' lb?
Miller- 1. 0 insignificant
Modigliani (1963)
Asset less insignificant
Percentage than 1.0
Myers' less less
Growth Options than 1.0 than 0
Merton unspecified insignificant
Miller (1976) 1
If the original Modigliani-Miller theory were correct, we
would expect every firm (ignoring behavioural influences) to completely
leverage its balance sheet to make ultimate use of tax shields on
interest payments. In this case, the constant term should approach 1.0,
and the growth options term should be insignificant.
If the asset-percentage theory, used to set our standard, were
actually correct, then we would expect the value of ta' to approach the
value of ?b! in the initial regression (Appendix B ), and again, we
would expect the value of ' to be insignificant.
Of course, if the Myers' theory is accurate, we expect that the
value of ?b? will be significantly negative-- the firms with growth options
representing a larger percentage of market value will tend to issue less
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debt. (In addition, we expect that the value of the constant will be
less than one to include the other agency costs of debt and the Miller
personal leverage theory.)
If Miller's latest theory were exclusively correct, than we
would not expect either ta' or TbT to be significant -- there should
be no systematic forces which influence the debt-equity decision.
It is important to note that in each of our tests, Aisplayed in
Figure 1, the values for 'a' and 'b' were as predicted by the Myers'
theory as shown in Figure 2. ( One must take the exponential of the
equation for the Multiplicative test ( using base Ye? since all logarithms
were natural logarithms) in order to obtain the proper values.) In each
case, the options term was quite significant and was negative in value.
The empirical results were most encouraging using the Quadratic spe-
cification and least satisfactory in the multiplicative form.
Of course, at this point, we can not compare the results to
the standard set by the Asset-percentage theory: these models forecast
percentage of assets financed by debt, not the total debt issued by the
industry. In order to test the predictive value of the equations, we must
multiply the fitted values solved for by the three regressions by the value
of assets for the industry, and run a simple regression of this 'fitted-
debt level' versus the actual level of debt - issued. The specification is:
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Debti =
where:
Debt.
1
Asseti
Fit;
c * (Asseti * Fit.)
= Level of debt for industry i
= Level of Assets for industry i
= Fitted value for Debt/Assets
This modified test was run for each of the three initial spe-
cifications of the original Myers' model and the results are shown in
Figure 3.
It is clear that in each case, the standard deviations are
lower than the 426.478 milliond dollars resulting from the asset-
percentage theory.
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Figure 3
Test Standard
Number R-Squared Deviation (in mil.)
1. .9996 62.4115
Linear
2. .9996 62.1324
Quadratic
3. .9855 205.745
Multiplicative
Of course, these tests have no value if instead of actually
testing the Myers Options theory, we are instead testing another
relationship which is coincidentally correlated with the PVGO theory.
It is clear that the Assets-percentage theory was not borne out by
our tests. Had the options term proved insignificant, we would have had to
seriously consider the possibility that firms do borrow solely on the
basis of their book value of assets.
A second theory we must consider involves the concept of
interest coverage. It is theorized that firms will alter debt levels
depending on the level of the interest coverage ratio (Earnings divided
by Interest Payments). If testing of this proposition proved that this
theory were correct, and if interest coverage ratios were correlated
with growth option, than our testing has no certain value. We specified
two separate models to test the interest coverage theory:
1.) iAD/A Ai
where:
EA =
E. =
Ii =
= a + b * (Ei/Ii)
Change in Debt for industry 1 (1975 minus 1974)
Change in Assets for industry i (1975 minus 1974)
Earnings for industry i (in 1974)
Interest payments for industry i (in 1974)
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2.) (D/A)i = a + b * (Ei/Ii)
where:
(D/A)i = Debt to Asset ratio for industry i (in 1974)
If the interest coverage theory were to hold, we would expect
that 'b' would be significant and positive -- as earnings relative to int-
erest payments increased, the firm should be willing to issue more
debt. The results, summarized in Figure 4, are shown in full in
Appendix K . In neither case was the interest coverage term sig-
nificant.
Two other theories of debt determination were tested. The first,
detailed in Appendix L, assumes that debt is simply a function of
earnings. The equation tested was:
(D/A). = a + b * (Ei/A.)
The second debt theory tested states that firms with volatile earnings
will tend to borrow less. The equation used to test this theory was:
(D/A)i = a + b* (SEi/Ei)
where:
SE. = Standard Error of the Normalized Earnings Equations
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A summary of the results for these last two tests are shown in Figure 4.
In neither case was the independent variable significant. (While the
Figure 4
Test
Name 'b' R-Squared
Interest -. 0459 0.0
Coverage #1 (.475619)
Interest -. 0114 0.0
Coverage #2 (.892974)
Earnings -1.532 .5564
(2. 4529)
Volatility .13202 . 2361
(1.0023)
[ Numbers in parehtheses are t-statistics ]
coefficient 'b' is significant in the earnings test, it has the wrong sign--
we would expect a positive correlation.)
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Conclusion
In the introduction, a system of theoretical forces and counter-
forces was described which would impel a firm toward adopting a cap-
ital structure which could correspond to the structure firms typically
do possess in the real world. Of these various factors, one was
isolated which, it was felt, would reward empirical study. This con-
cept, Myers' theory of Real Options, was then discussed in greater
depth in the first chapter of this thesis. We then proceeded to describe
the various tests which we designed to test whether the presence of
real options in a firm's portfolio of assets affected, in the real world,
the amount of debt in the balance sheet of the firm. The results of the
test demonstrated that there was indeed a strong correlation between
the two. An attempt to provide an alternative explanation, that is, that
the correlation was an accidental result of coincidence between the real
determinant-- the desire of management to keep interest payments below
a certain fraction of earnings, and the size of the PVGO's of the firm--
proved to be a failure.
The results of the regressions (based, admittedly on a small
sample) suggest that firms with no real options would tend to adopt a
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capital structure which approximates 35% of the book value of their
assets. As Myers suggests, the concept of differentiation between
real assets and real options leads one to hypothesize that firms will
adopt a capital structure based on the book value of the assets of the
firm, rather than on the market value of the firm. The mechanism
whereby this has come about, in the absence of any formal reali-
zation by the managers of the firm of the implications of the presence
of growth opportunities in the asset structure of the firm, is dis-
cussed in the last part of the introduction, in terms of Merton Miller's
concept of a pool of heuristics which direct the financial decision--
making behaviour of the firm's managers in the absence of any formally
appreciated financial theory.
In other words, the managers of the firmwithout any clear or
well-defined reasons, base their debt decision on the book value of their
assets; the reason that this particular piece of folklore has survived
to determine the decisions of the managers is that, in practice, it has
proved to have survival value.
Can we go further and find some similar heuristic which provides
us with a similar explanation for the fact that firms with growth oppor-
tunities take on a smaller amount of debt? A possible solution may be
found in an analysis of what happens to the price-earnings ratio of a
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firm when it has growth opportunities, and how this may effect the
behaviour of the managers of the firm. In the description of the
tests, we thoroughly exfflored the fact that as the growth opportunities
of a firm increased, so did its price-eqrnings ratio. To the naive
manager, it will appear that the stock of the firm is at an excep-
tionally 'good' level, in terms of its relation to the price of firms
with similar earnings (but lower growth opportunities). Accordingly,
if at any time the firm needs additional capital, it will do so by
issuing equity, because the manager believes that it is advantageous
to issue equity when the shares are so high priced. On the other
hand, when shares appear 'undervalued'--i. e. when there are no future
growth opportunities to raise the price of the stock-- the naive manager
will decide on debt as the financing instrument of choice, since he
does not wish to 'dilute his equity'. Modern financial theory, as re-
presented by the Capital Asset Pricing Model, can clearly demonstrate
the theoretical inappropriateness of this approach, but it is still a
concept which determines the behaviour of many financial managers.
If, then, the tendency is to finance with equity when there are
growth opportunities, and to finance with debt when there are not, it
can be seen that once again we have found an operationally functional
heuristic which, although it is based upon unsound principles, nevertheless
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acts as the practical doppelganger to a sound financial theory.
To suggest that this twinning of theoretical imperative with
practical heuristic is actually what is occuring would amount to no
more than speculation, were it not for the impressive correlation
which we have found in our regression analses. In the light of the
results, we can certainly go so far as to say that we have identified
both a theoretical and a practical reason as to why firms behave in
the way we observe.
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APPENDIX A
DEBT(Y-AXIS) VS ASSETS(X-AXIS)
10000 20000
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APPENDIX B
RESULTS OF ASSET-PERCENTAGE REGRESSION
DEBT = -54.7486 + .280452 * ASSET
(.201541) (14. 3808)
Where:
DEBT
ASSET
: Nominal level of debt for the industry ( in millions of dollars)
: Nominal level of assets for the industry (in millions of dollars)
Summary Statistics
R-Squared : .9809
Durbin-Watson :1. 4887
Standard Error : 426.478
[ Numbers in parentheses are T-statictics for regression coefficients.]
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DEBT VS ASSET REGRESSION
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APPENDIX C
Textile Products
Number Company Name Major Products
1. Burlington Ind. Inc. Fabrics, Knits, Hosiery
2. Collins & Aikman Fabrics for Apparel
3. Cone Mills Corp. Cotton Textiles, Corduroy
4. Dan River Inc. Fabrics for Apparel
5. Fieldcrest Mills Textile Products
6. Lowenstein & Sons Apparel Fabrics
7. Springs Mills Inc. Apparel Fabrics
8. Stevens (JP) & Co. Double knits, Hosiery
9. United Merchants & Mfg Textiles
10. West Point-Pepperell Apparel Fabrics
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Chemicals
Number Company Name Major Products
11. Allied Chemical Co. Basic Chemicals, Plastics
12. Celanese Corp. Chemicals, Plastics
13. Dow Chemical Chemicals, Fibers
14. Dupont ( EI) de Nem. Chemicals, Fibers
15. Grace (WR) & Co. Specialty Chemicals
16. Koppers Co. Inc. Chemicals, Plastics
17. Olin Corp. Chemicals
18. Rohm & Haas Co. PlasticsFibers
19. Stauffer Chemical Chemicals
20. Union Carbide Corp. Chemicals, Plastics
-47-
Electrical Switches & Controls
Number Company Name Major Products
21. AMP Inc. Electrical Connectors & Tools
22. Burndy Corp. Connectcrs & Tools
23. Crouse-Hinds Co. Controls
24. Cutler-Hammer Inc. Electrical Switching Equip.
25. Johnson Controls Elect. Control Systems
26. Leeds & Northrup Controls
27. ]Ranco Inc. Control Devices
28. Robertshaw Controls Automatic Controls
29. Square D Co. Switching & Control Equip.
30. Thomas & Betts Electrical Connectors
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Machine Tools
Number Company Name Major Products
31. Acme-Cleveland Corp. Automatic Machine Tools
32. Brown & Sharp Mfg. Co. Machine Tools,Small Tools
33. Carborundum Co. Machine Tools
34. Cincinnati Milacron Inc. Large Machine Tools
35. Giddings & Lewis Inc. Machine Tools
36. Kearney & Trecker Corp. Machine Tools
37. Norton Co. Grinding Equip.
38. Stanley Works Electric Tools
39. Sundstrand Corp. Diversified Machine Tools
40. Warner & Swasey Co. Machine Tools
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Drugs
Number Company Name Major Products
41. Bristol-Myers Co. Pharmaceuticals
42. Pfizer Inc. Drugs, Cosmetics
43. Merck & Co. Pharmaceuticals, Calgon
44. Lilly (Eli) & Co. Phamaceuticals, Eliz.
Arden
45. Abbott Laboratories Pharmaceuticals
46. Upjohn Co. Pharmaceuticals
47. Schering-Plough Corp. Drugs, Cosmetics
48. Searle (GD) & Co. Pharmaceuticals
49. Smithkline Corp. Drugs, Cosmetics
50. Baxter Travenol Labs Pharmaceuticals
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APPENDIX D
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE
Source of Sum of Degrees of Mean F
Variation Squared Errors Freedom Squared Error Value
Between
Industries 19.5 4 4.875 2.13
Within
Industries
Total
103.1
122.6
45
R i
49
2.291
The result is significant with respect to the 90% confidence interval.
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APPENDIX E
TO RHSET RRTIO5:TEXTILE INDUSTRY
DI 02 03 04 05 06 01 06 09 ID
# Company
1 Burlington Industries Inc.
2 Collins & Aikman Corp.
3 Cone Mills Corp.
4 Dan River Inc.
5 Fieldcrest Mills Inc.
# Company
6 Lowenstein (M) & Sons
7 Springs Mills Inc.
8 Stevens (J P) & Co.
9 United Merchants & Mfrs.
10 West Point-Pepperell Inc.
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50
95
40
3DI
20
I
40
30
IIEBT TORSSETRRTIIOS:[HEMIERLINDJUSTRY _____
II
, 00 AI( di'1~ F
1-1 11 12 13 14f 15 1E 1-1 1B 19 20
# Company
11 Allied Chemical Corp.
12 Celanese Corp.
13 Dow Chemical
14 Dupont (E 1) de Nemours
15 Grace (W R) & Co.
# Company
16 Koppers Co. Inc.
17 Olin Corp.
18 Rohm & Haas Co.
19 Stauffer Chemical Co.
20 Union Carbide Corp.
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35
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5
D 21 22 23 24 25 26 21 28 29 30
Company
AMP Inc.
Burndy Corp.
Grouse-Hinds Co.
Cutler-Hammer Inc.
Johnson Controls Inc.
27
28
29
30
Company
Leeds & Northrup Co.
]3anco Inc.
Roberthaw Controls Co.
Square D Co.
Thomas & Betts Corp.
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0 2 r _A 35 3 f1 x 9 90__ _IZ31 392 33 34 35 35 9-1 9 E9 4
Company
Acme-Cleveland Corp.
Brown & Sharp Mfg. Co.
Carborundum Co.
Cincinnati Milacron Inc.
Giddings & Lewis Inc.
# Company
36 Kearney & Trecker Corp.
37 Norton Co.
38 Stanley Works
39 Sundstrand Corp.
40 Warner & Swasey Co.
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31
32
33
34
35
1
50
'+0
30
20
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0 41 42 +3 44 45 46 41 9+8 q9 5D
# Company
41 Bristol-Myers Co.
42 Pfizer Inc.
43 Merck & Co.
44 Lilly (Eli) & Co.
45 Abbott Laboratories
# Company
46 Upjohn Co.
47 Schering-Plough Corp.
48 Searle (G. D.) & Co.
49 Smithkline Corp.
50 Baxter Travenol Labs
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Tools Chemicals Drugs
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I1
.7
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0
Textiles Controls
Company Company Actual Normalized PVGO Debt
# Name Earnings Earnings B k Mkt. Value Assets
1. Burlington Ind. 39.77 71.46 1.18 15. 55 .41 . 31
2. Collins-Aikman. 18.37 12.67 1.38 17.27 .00 .275
3. Cone Mills 24.24 22.00 .87 12.88 .00 .205
4. Dan River -2.95 3.63 .81 12.37 .28 .37
5. Fielderest Mills 9.927 5.43 .94 13.48 .25 .383
6. Lowenstein -5.89 2.37 1.45 17.87 .65 .448
7. Springs Mills 10.69 17.16 .63 10.82 .00 .198
8. Stevens & Co. 19.90 37.04 1.01 14.09 .00 .321
9. United Merch. -18.65 3.52 .70 11.42 .55 .47
10. West Point-P'll 19.76 25.86 1.02 14.17 .00 .161
Industry 115.17 201.14 .233 .332
Total
01 z-
Company Company Actual Normalized PVGO Debt
# Name Earnings Earnings B k Mkt. Value Assets
11. Allied Chemical 116.20 144.90 1.03 14.26 .00 .292
12. Celanese 50.00 71.06 .79 12.19 .04 .302
13. Dow Chemical 615.70 672.90 1.25 16.15 .51 .362
14. Dupont de Nem. 271.80 364.10 .91 13.23 .55 .183
15. Grace & Co. 166.70 168.20 1.07 14.60 .00 .326
16. Koppers 60.33 60.18 1.07 14.60 .05 .265
17. Olin Corp. 59.41 61.72 .77 12.02 .00 .248
18. Rohm & Haas 22.98 49.17 1.36 17.10 .61 .386
19. Stauffer Chemical 98.71 100.70 .98 13.83 .21 .310
20. Union Carbide 381.70 492.60 1.24 16.06 .18 .274
Industry 1843.53 2185.53 .392 .284
Total
0
Company Company Actual Normalized PVGO Debt
# Name Earnings Earnings B k Mkt. Value Assets
21. AMP Inc. 27.77 39.96 1.48 18.13 .77 .14
22. Burndy Corp. 8.81 9.20 1.69 19.93 .50 .178
23. Crouse-Hinds Co. 12.82 12.54 1.29 16.48 .10 .119
24. Cutler-Hammer Inc. 13.94 16.08 1.49 18.21 .12 .278
25. Johnson Controls 9.32 6.48 1.13 15.12 .08 .284
26. Leeds & Northrup 4.19 3.04 1.24 16.06 .11 .397
27. ]Ranco Inc. -1.35 1.93 .62 10.73 .00 .321
28. Robertshaw Controls 2.94 4.10 1.14 15.20 .48 .196
29. Square D Co. 35.86 36.85 1.22 15.89 .53 .174
30. Thomas & Betts 13.26 15.61 1.31 16.67 .64 .019
Industry 127.56 145.79 .60 .204
Total
7
Company Company Actual Normalized PVGO Debt
# Name Earnings Earnings B k Mkt. Value Assets
31. Acme-Cleveland 6.96 8.38 .98 13.83 .00 .351
32. Brown & Sharp -. 39 1.47 1.17 15.46 .269 .269
33. Carborundum 27.19 29.15 1.32 16.75 .084 .218
34. Cincinnati Milacron 9.95 13.75 .93 13.40 .00 .415
35. Giddings & Lewis 5.07 4.15 1.83 21.14 .019 .422
36. Kearney & Trecker 5.70 2.85 2.40 26.04 .69 .150
37. Norton Co. 20.89 25.43 .81 12.37 .00 .240
38. Stanley Works 17.39 19.07 .97 13.74 .21 .275
39. Sundstrand Corp. 21.97 24.42 1.95 22.17 .02 .509
40. Warner & Swasey 6.02 9.19 1.37 17.18 .02 .309
Industry 120.75 137.85 .10 .331
Totals
Company Company Actual Normalized PVGO Debt
# Name Earnings Earnings B k Mkt. Value Assets
41. Bristol-Myers Co. 141.70 140.10 1.24 16.06 .60 .119
42. Pfizer Inc. 147.70 150.30 1.17 15.46 .49 .323
43. Merck & Co. 228.80 235.40 .95 13.57 .67 .208
44. Lilly (Eli) & Co. 181.30 197.10 .99 13.91 .60 .012
45. Abbott Laboratories 70.67 72.15 1.29 16.49 .61 .332
46. Upjohn Co. 66.75 75.30 .42 9.01 .34 .270
47. Schering-Plough 138.90 147.30 1.03 14.26 .63 .004
48. Searle (GD) & Co. 80.54 84.61 1.25 16.15 .32 .464
49. Smithkline Corp. 63. 59 63.18 1.06 14.52 .50 .242
50. Baxter Travenol 44.47 43.98 1.49 18.21 .81 .251
Industry 1164.42 1209.42 .60 .221
Total
7
APPENDIX H
RESULTS OF MODEL # 1 REGRESSION
D/A) = .375010 -
(21.2566)
Where:
D/A
%PVGO
.261325 * %PVGO
(6.41558)
: Ratio of Book Value of Debt to Book Value of Assets
for the industry
: Ratio of Present Value of Growth Opportunities to
Market Value of Equity for the industry
Summary Statistics
R-Squared
Durbin-Watson
Standard Error
: .9094
:1.1632
: .0180712
Right-Hand
Variable
%PVGO
Partial
Correlation
-. 965435
[ Numbers in parentheses are T-statistics for regression coefficients]
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Mean
.385
Elasticity
at Mean
-. 366654
.34
.32
.30
.28
.26
.24
.22
.20
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.36
Textiles Tools Cheiilcals Drugs Controls
jRESULTS OF MODEL # 2 REGRESSION
= .341647 - .358477 * (%PVGO) 2
(47. 5862) (11. 9387)
Where:
D/A
%PVGO
: Ratio of Book Value of Debt to Book Value of Assets
for the industry
: Ratio of Present Value of Growth Opportunities to Market
Value of Equity for the industry
Summary Statistics
R -Squared .9725
Durbin-Watson
Standard Error
Right-Hand
Variable
(%PVGO)2
: 1.4503
: .0099545
Partial
Correlation
-. 989639
[ Numbers in parentheses are T-statistics for regression coefficients.]
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D/A
Mean
.187591
Elasticity
at Mean
-. 245069
:ACTUAL(LINE) VS FI
Tools Chemicals Drugs
-67-
.34
.32
.30
.28
.26
.24
.22
.20
Textiles Controls
RESULTS OF MODEL # 3 REGRESSION
LOG (D/A) = -1.61072 - .260142 * LOG( %PVGO)
(14. 0938) (3. 02369)
Where:
D/A : Ratio of Book Value of Debt to Book Value of Assets
for the industry
%PVGO : Ratio of Present Value of Growth Opportunities to
Market Value of Equity for the industry
Summary Statistics (transformed into levels)
R -Squared : .7113
Durbin-Watson : .8850
Standard Error : .0322619
Right-Hand
Variable
LOG(%PVGO)
Partial
Correlation
-. 867720
Mean
-1.14349
Elasticity
at Mean
-. 226513
[ Numbers in parentheses are T-statistics for regression coefficients.]
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APPENDIX I
RESULTS OF INDIVIDUAL FIRM IEGRESSION FOR MODEL #1
D/A = .266795 - .0795248*(%PVGO) + .064*Xl + .045*X2 - .029*X3
(5.16869) (2.24855) (1.19) (.835) (.583)
+ .059*X4
(1.04)
Where:
D/A : Debt to Asset ratio for each firm
%PVGO : Ratio of Present Value of Growth Opportunities to Market
Value for the firm
Xl : Dummy Variable for Textile Industry
X2 : Dummy Variable for Chemical Industry
X3 : Dummy Variable for Control Industry
X4 : Dummy Variable for Tool Industry
Summary Statistics
R-Squared : .0956
Durbin-Watson : 2.4136
Standard Error : .10849
[ Numbers in parentheses are T-statistics for regression coefficients.]
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APPENDIX J
RESULTS OF MODIFIED MODEL # 1 REGRESSION
DEBT = 1.038 * (ASSET * FIT)
(139.063)
Where:
DEBT
ASSET
FIT
: Nominal level of debt for the industry (in millions of dollars)
: Nominal level of assets for the industry (in millions of dollars)
: Fitted values for Model # 1
Summary Statistics
R - Squared
Durbin-Watson
Standard Error
: .9996
: . 4738
62.4115
[ Numbers in parentheses are T-statistics for regression coefficients.]
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T extiles Drugs
RESULTS OF MODIFIED MODEL # 2 REGRESSION
DEBT = .995328 * (ASSET * FIT)
(139,688)
: Nominal level of debt for industry (in millions of dollars)
: Nominal levels of assets for industry (in millions of dollars)
: Fitted values for Model # 2
Summary Statistics
R - Squared
Durbin-Watson
Standard Error
: .9996
: 1.5412
62.1324
[ Numbers in parentheses are T-statistics for regression coefficients.]
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Textiles
RESULTS OF MODIFIED MODEL # 3 REGRESSION
DEBT = 1.09555 * (ASSET * FIT)
(42.1408)
Where:
DEBT
ASSET
FIT
Nominal level of debt for industry (in millions of dollars)
Nominal level of assets for the industry (in millions of dollars)
Fitted values for Model # 3 ( transformed to levels.)
Summary Statistics
R - Squared
Durbin-Watson
Standard Error
.9956
.4614
205.745
[ Numbers in parentheses are T-statistics for regression coefficients.]
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APPENDIX K
RESULTS OF INTEREST-COVERAGE REGRESSION # 1
D/ /A= .679456 - .0458884 * (E/I)
(1.87940) (.475619)
Where:
A D/A A
E/I
Change in Debt divided by Change in Assets for the
industry (1975 minus 1974)
Ratio of Earnings to Interest Payments for the industry
Summary Statistics
R - Squared
Durbin-Watson
Standard Error
0.0
: .8115
S.527887
[ Numbers in parentheses are T-statistics for regression coefficients.]
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RESULTS OF INTEREST-COVERAGE REGRESSION # 2
D/A = .309771 - .0114 * (E/I)
(6. 41946) (.89297)
Where:
D/A Debt to Asset ratio for the industry
EI :Ratio of Earnings to Interest Payments for the industry
Summary Statistics
R-Squared
Durbin-Watson
Standard Error
0.0
2.8309
.061625
[ Numbers in parentheses are T-statistics for regression coefficients]
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RESULTS OF
APPENDIX L
DEBT VS EARNINGS MODEL
D/A
Where:
D/A
E/A
S.367382
(8.76513)
-1. 53219 * E/A
(2.45292)
: Ratio of Book Value of Assets to Book Value of Debt
for the industry
: Ratio of the Book Value of Earnings to Book Value of
Assets for the industry
Summary Statistics
R-Squared . 5564
Durbin-Watson : 2.8466
Standard Error: .03999
[ Numbers in parentheses are T-statistics for regression coefficients.]
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APPENDIX M
RESULTS OF DEBT VS VOLATILITY MODEL
D/A .23532 + .132028 * SE/E
(6.699) (1.0023)
Where:
D/A : Ratio of Book Value of Assets to '-Book Value of Debt
for the industry
SE/E : Ratio of the Standard Error of the Normalized Earnings
regressions (summed over firms) to Earnings for the
industry
Summary Statistics
R-Squared
Durbin-Watson
Standard Error
: .2361
: 3.4776
: .052478
[ Numbers in parentheses are T-statistics for regression coefficients.]
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